Introduction
In order to capture some of the programmers errors, several computer languages, like Pascal and ML, are equipped with a type system. Using the Curry-Howard interpretation of propositions as types 3, 8] , or as we shall say here, propositions as sets, a type system can be made strong enough to be used to specify the task a program is supposed to do. This is one of the basis for Martin-L of's suggestion in 11] to use his formulation of type theory for programming; his ideas are exploited in 14] and there are several computer implementations of type theory 4, 16] . Similar ideas are also behind Coquand and Huet's calculus of constructions 2] .
The idea of propositions as sets is closely related to the intuitionistic explanations of the logical constants given by Heyting 7] . In Martin-L of's type theory, the interpretation of propositions as sets is fundamental since the notions of proposition and set are identical. So a logical constant is de nitionally equal to the corresponding set constant. Conversely, every set forming operation can be viewed as a logical constant, although some sets are more natural to think of as data types.
When using Martin-L of's type theory for programming one often has to use strong principles, like a universe or well-orderings, when writing speci cations or de ning data types. For instance, a universe must be used when de ning a proposition by induction on natural numbers or lists. There are disadvantages of using a universe and I will instead introduce an extension of type theory by which the use of a universe often can be avoided.
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The main reason why the rules given here have not been formulated before is that they require the distinction between sets and types. This is a basic idea of Martin-L of's framework for type theory, which he rst presented in a lecture in G oteborg in March 1986. The extension put forward here is that the elimination rules for the various set forming operations should be generalized so that the conclusion of such a rule is not restricted to be of the form \c is an element in the set C " but will be of the form \c is an object of the type ". This means that it will be possible to de ne type valued functions by recursion on a set and, in particular, to de ne propositional functions by recursion without using a universe. It is then important that the elimination rules are formulated in the general way suggested by Schroeder- Heister 19, 20] .
I will rst brie y describe, following 15], how sets in Martin-L of's type theory can be viewed as speci cations and then why a universe sometimes must be used when expressing propositions. A presentation of the separation of sets and types will be given before the extension is formulated. Finally, I will give an interpretation of the extended type theory into type theory with one universe.
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Speci cations as sets
The idea of of viewing a speci cation of computer programs as a set in Martin-L of's type theory has its origin both in understanding propositions as sets and in Kolmogorov's explanation in 9] of propositions as problems. Kolmogorov explains the sentential constants in the following way:
A^B is the problem of solving both of the problems A and the problem B . A _ B is the problem of solving at least one of the problems A and B . A B is the problem of solving the problem B provided that a solution to the problem A is given.
? is a problem which has no solution. Using the interpretation of propositions as sets and viewing a speci cation as a problem, which a program satisfying the speci cation solves, we can read these explanations as:
A B is a speci cation of programs which, when executed, give a pair ha; bi where the program a satis es the speci cation A and the program b satis es the speci cation B .
A + B is a speci cation of programs which, when executed, either give inl(a) where the program a satis es the speci cation A or inr(b) where the program b satis es the speci cation B .
A ! B is a speci cation of programs which, when executed, give x:b(x) where the program b(a) satis es the speci cation B if a is a program satisfying the speci cation A.
; is a speci cation which is not satis ed by any program. Type constructors corresponding to , + and ! occurs in many typed programming languages. However, in order to obtain a type system in which any interesting speci cations can be expressed, we need cartesian products and disjoint unions on families of sets so that the quanti ers can be interpreted: Beside these set forming operations corresponding to the the logical constants, we need a set Id(A; a; b) expressing that the elements a and b of the set A are identical. We also need a number of basic data types like the set N of natural numbers and the set List(A) of lists of elements in a set A. However, many speci cations can still not be expressed with these sets but require a universe.
3 The need of a universe Martin-L of's rst formulation of type theory 10] contained a universe V in which all sets were elements, including V itself. Such a universe would have been very practical to use but, by Girard's paradox, V 2 V implies that all sets are non-empty; hence, it is impossible to interpret propositions as sets. In Martin-L of 12], the universe V is replaced by a series of universes U 0 ; U 1 ; : : : where U 0 is the set of small sets and U n 2 U n+1 . Following the semantics in Martin-L of 11], where a set is de ned by prescribing how the canonical elements are formed, it is natural to view an element in a universe as a code for the corresponding set; this is the approach in 14, 21] and will be used here.
I will in this section give two examples how one is forced to use a universe in two basic applications; the rst is when de ning a simple proposition by induction and the second is when proving negated equalities.
If we, informally, want to de ne a predicate member(a; l) which expresses that a 2 A is a member of the list l 2 List(A) where A is a set, we can do that by structural induction on the list l : However, member is a set valued function. So, in order to be able to apply list-elimination to show that member(a; l) is a proposition, i.e. a set, we must have a family C(v) of sets on List(A) so that ; 2 C(nil) and Id(A; a; x) + z 2 C(x:y) x 2 A; y 2 List(A); z 2 C(y)]. Hence, we must have a universe in which the sets we are using are elements.
To express member , we need the following codes, writing U for the rst universe U 0 , There are two disadvantages with this de nition of member . First, the de nition involves some coding compared with the informal de nition of member . This is not so serious, since we could introduce some syntactical sugaring to avoid the coding. The second objection is more severe: the judgement member(a; l) set a 2 A; l 2 List(A)] holds only when A is a small set, i.e. when A 2 U . So member is actually not de ned for all sets A; in particular, we cannot use the above de nition if U was used when de ning the set A.
I will here just hint how a universe can be used to show that 0 is di erent from 1 , for the details see 14] . By recursion on the natural numbers, we can de ne a function F such that
where T is the singleton set fttg . Since F is set valued, the formal de nition of F in type theory requires a universe:
where natrec is the recursion operator on the set of natural numbers. Assuming Id(N; 0; 1) it is easy, using tt 2 F(1), to show that F(0) is nonempty. Since F(0) = ; we then obtain Id(N; 0; 1) ! ; , i.e., by de nition, :Id(N; 0; 1) . In Smith 22] it is shown that in type theory without a universe, no negated equalities at all can be proved. 4 The logical framework
The main reason to introduce a type level, more basic than the level of sets, is to have a framework in which sets can be introduced by simple declarations. This is important when building a computer system since you then do not want to make major changes of the implementation when introducing a new set forming operation. The Edinburgh LF 6] is based on similar ideas.
The type level introduced by Martin-L of has judgements of the forms is a type, and are equal types, a is an object of the type , and a and b are equal objects of the type , which we formally write : type = : type a: a = b: respectively. In a series of lectures in Florence in spring 1987, Martin-L of presented a detailed semantics of the type level in which judgemental equality is intensional. When building up Martin-L of's set theory using the framework, we need function types, the type of sets and to each object in the type of sets, the type of elements of that set. The rules are formulated in a natural deduction style, but we will here not give the general rules concerned with substitution, equality and handling of contexts; the semantics and rules are given in detail in 17].
If where (a=x) denotes the result of substituting a for the free variable x, assuming the usual restrictions on the free variables of a. We also have the following de nitional equalities for objects in a function type:
We will use the abbreviation ( ) for (x : ) when does not depend on x and we will often display f : (x 1 : 1 ) (x n : n ) as f : ( x 1 : 1 ) . . .
The notation f(x 1 ; : : :; x n ) will be used for the repeated applications f(x 1 ) (x n ) and, similarly, we will write (x 1 ; : : : ; x n )e for the repeated abstractions (x 1 ) (x n )e. That there is a type of sets is expressed by the rule set -formation set : type If we have a set A we may form a type El(A) whose objects are the elements of the set A:
El -formation A : set El(A) : type The notation a 2 A, which we used in the beginning of the paper, can now be seen as an abbreviation of a : El(A) .
We illustrate how sets can be introduced in the framework by declaring the constants for the set of natural numbers and cartesian products.
That N is a set is expressed by N : set The constructors for elements in N Using the rules of the framework, we may derive the natural deduction rules for the natural numbers in Martin-L of's set theory. For instance, from the declaration of natrec , we may obtain the elimination rule for natural numbers
e(x; y) : El(C(succ(x))) x : El(N); y : El(C(x))] natrec(C; n; d; e) : El(C(n)) Note that, in the conclusion of the rule, the expression natrec(C; n; d; e) contains the family C(v) on N . This is a consequence of the explicit declaration of natrec in the framework, but C is also needed in the expression if we want mechanical type checking. So, when expressing set theory in the framework, we obtain a monomorphic theory. We may de ne a stripping function on the expressions which takes away the set information and we would then obtain expressions of the polymorphic theory in 11, 13] . However, the polymorphic theory is fundamentally di erent from the monomorphic theory; in Salvesen 18] it is shown that there are derivable judgements in the polymorphic theory which cannot come from any derivable judgement in the monomorphic theory by stripping.
The cartesian product on a family of sets is formed by the declaration : (A : set)((B : El(A))set) set
The elements in a cartesian product are obtained by -abstraction: 8 -elimination when interpreting propositions as sets. However, this elimination rule does not follow the pattern of the other elimination rules of Martin-L of's set theory in that it does not express a recursion principle. In the preface of Martin-L of 13], higher order assumptions were introduced by which it is possible to formulate recursion on a cartesian product. The selector apply is then replaced by funsplit , which is declared by funsplit : (A :set) (B :(El(A))set) (C : (El( (A; B) ))set) we have as one of the premisses that C(v) is a family of sets on the set of natural numbers. In order to strengthen the rule so that we e.g. can de ne family of sets by recursion without using a universe, we generalize the rule to an arbitrary family of types on the natural ( (0=v)) (e : (x :El(N)) ( (x=v)) (succ(x)=v)) (n=v)
We also have to assert the de nitional equalities Note that we cannot introduce a Natrec -operator uniformly over all families of types on the set of natural numbers but instead have to, given a family , introduce a new constant Natrec . This is in contrast to the declaration of natrec , which is the same constant for all families C(v) of sets on the natural numbers. If we want a uniform operator, we would have to extend the framework with yet another level where we would have type as object; such a level would correspond to the level of kinds in the Edinburgh LF 6] .
To introduce a type valued recursion operator on a cartesian product (A; B) where A : set and B : (x : El(A)) set , we must rst have a family of types on the cartesian product. So let : type v : El( (A; B))] be given. The constant Funsplit is then introduced by the declaration In the same way as for N , (A; B) and A B , it is now straightforward to introduce type valued recursion operators for the other sets.
Applications of the extension
We can now de ne member in type theory so that the de nition really captures the informal de nition we gave earlier. We rst introduce a type valued recursion operator on To express member , the family in Listrec is chosen to be the constant family set :
Listrec set : (El(List(A))) (set) (e : (El(A))(El(List(A)))(set) set) set
We can now introduce member by the explicit de nition member(a; l) = Listrec set (l; ;; (x; y; z)(Id(A; a; x) + z)) : set l : El(List(A)); a : El(A)]
Negated equalities can now be derived without a universe. In the proof of :Id(N; 0; 1) , a function F satisfying F(0) = ; F(1) = T was used. F can now be de ned by F(n) = Natrec set (n; ;; (x; y)T) and :Id(N; 0; 1) can be proved.
The So apply (A;B) is de ned by just applying Funsplit (x :El(A))El(B(x)) on the identity function of ((x : El(A))El(B(x))) (x : El(A))El(B(x)) .
In Synek 23 ] type valued recursion is used when de ning a set constructor for mutual recursive sets in terms of well-orderings. In this application, type valued recursion is crucial since otherwise, using a universe instead, the interpretation would only work for recursion involving small sets. A similar application of type valued recursion is also used in 14] when interpreting subsets in type theory.
7 Relation to universes I will in this section sketch an interpretation of set theory with type valued recursion but without a universe into set theory with a universe but without type valued recursion. Aczel has shown in 1] (see also 5]) that the proof theoretic ordinal of Martin-L of's type theory with a universe is, in Veblen's notation, 0 (0). So we will then get an upper limit on the strength of set theory extended with type valued recursion. In particular, we will know that the extension is consistent.
The universe U is de ned by an inductive de nition so one can justify an elimination rule expressing a recursion principle on U ; such an elimination rule is formulated in 14]. Since the concept of set is open, there is no corresponding induction principle for set and this is an important di erence between type theory with a universe and type theory extended with type valued recursion. The formulation of type theory investigated in 1] does not include an elimination rule for U ; if such a rule is added, one would expect a considerable increase of the proof theoretic strength.
The interpretation is de ned in the following way. To each type we associate a set ). Since we have -conversion for objects of a function type but not for elements in a cartesian product, assumptions cannot be directly interpreted by a corresponding assumption; instead we must interpret an assumption x : (x 1 : 1 ) (x n : n ) x : (x 1 : 1 ) (x n : n ) ] by the derivable judgement x 1 : : : x n : apply(: : :apply(x; x 1 ) : : :; x n ) :
El(( x 1 :
where stripping is used on and apply in order to avoid heavy notation. I will often use stripping in the sequel, but it will always be clear from the context how to decorate the terms with types. Given these de nitions, together with the interpretation below of the various constants, it is straightforward but tedious to prove, by induction on the length of the derivation, that if a judgement is derivable in type theory with type valued recursion then the interpretation of the judgement is derivable in type theory with a universe.
7.1
Interpretation of the set theoretic constants
The interpretation follows the same pattern for all the set theoretic constants. So we will only give the de nitions for cartesian product and natural numbers, including type valued recursion on the natural numbers.
For each constant, we rst give the interpretation of its type and then it is quite obvious how the interpretation of the constant must be de ned. When a constant is declared to be an object in a function type, it is always the case that the interpretation is on form; hence they are -convertible. 
The interpretation of the type of is, according to the de nitions above,
where we have used the notation Set(X) ! U for (Set(X); (x)U) since x does not occur inU. Using function application, we obtain from (1) The constant natrec interpreted in a similar way.
Interpretation of Natrec . Let be a family of types on the set of natural numbers:
: type v : El(N)]
The recursion operator Natrec is introduced by the declaration Natrec : (n : El(N))(D : (0=v))(E : (x : El(N))(Y : (x=v)) (succ(x)=v) (n)
The interpretation of the type of Natrec is 
